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The emergence of behavioral economics has revealed a number of insights into 
economic and business phenomena by integrating elements of economic theory and 
experimental psychology. So far, the behavioral economics research agenda has 
concentrated on the empirical validity of foundational assumptions, producing new 
descriptive accounts of behavioral patterns that are difficult to explain using traditional 
neoclassical assumptions. This agenda has now developed sufficiently to begin exploring 
how to apply these descriptive findings from behavioral economics to improve human 
performance, business decision-making and economic policy.  
Forging a new normative economics based on behavioral theory is an ambitious 
goal. There is not yet consensus, even among behavioral economists, that standard 
normative theories in economics, such as the Fundamental Welfare Theorems built on 
axiomatic assumptions of self-interest, self-consistent utility maximization and perfect 
information, are in need of revision.  Starting from the observation that individual 
behavior systematically deviates from textbook prescriptions for rational decision 
making, a broad range of sometimes conflicting conclusions about normative economics 
can be drawn.  For example, some argue that, when behavior deviates from textbook 
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prescriptions, people’s behavior should be revised rather than normative model, e.g., 
teaching MBA students to correctly apply Bayes Rule rather than abandoning Bayes Rule 
as a measure of rational decision making.  Others argue that, because individuals fail to 
meet the idealized standard of perfect economic rationality, behavioral theory provides a 
new rationale for paternalistic intervention aiming to “de-bias” individual behavior, e.g., 
taxing potato chips and subsidizing carrots to correct for impulsive consumer decisions at 
the grocery store.  Still others argue that normative benchmarks such as transitivity, 
expected utility axioms, the rules of set-theoretic logic, and probability theory, are largely 
irrelevant criteria for deciding whether a particular decision process works well in its 
respective environment.   
Eagerly venturing into disputed terrain, the goal of this special issue is to help 
bridge the gap between behavioral economic theory and its normative application in 
business decision-making and applied economic policy analysis. The title of 
Matsumoto’s lead article, “Seeking a Realistic Way of Individual Decision Making,” 
could serve as a subtitle for any article in this volume. Indeed, the search for improved 
empirical realism provides an important unifying theme.  Matsumoto introduces a new 
theoretical model which shows that self-consistency over an individual’s life course is not 
a necessary condition for rationality.  A critical problem with the standard model is its 
assumption that individuals make high-stakes life decisions by considering an exhaustive 
list of possible actions (and, when risk is involved, payoffs associated with the multiple 
possible outcomes that are associated with each action).  Matsumoto’s model deals 
explicitly with the fact that the individual cannot fully anticipate future choice sets, or the 
mapping from current action into future opportunity sets, in any meaningful way. 
Serendipity indeed appears to play a large role in the lives of many of the leading voices 
in business, arts and letters. 
 
Three articles in this volume draw on original data sources to investigate bounded self-
interest and bounded information processing.  Chakravarty, Haruvy and Wu use survey 
data to investigate discrepancies between standard models of innovation and the real-
world facts surrounding open source software development.  Interestingly, they find that 
bounded self-interest coexists alongside usual self-interested profit motives in spurring on 
different dimensions of product performance.   Tisdell shows that policy makers intent on 
using survey methods to elicit voters’ willingness to pay for environmental resources face 
formidable challenges because of the extreme sensitivity of stated willingness to pay with 
respect to minor variations in the information provided to survey respondents.  Tisdell 
demonstrates cases, however, for which cost-benefit considerations reach the same 
conclusion over the entire range of willingnesses to pay, suggesting that the technique 
may provide useful output despite its imprecision.  Li and Pingle report new experimental 
results on positional concern, asking whether it helps or hurts aggregate performance to 
provide individuals with information about their relative standing in the group.  In 
contrast to the view that more feedback about relative position will reduce performance 
by discouraging low performers, these experimental results suggest that more information 
or, alternatively interpreted, better transparency, about relative standing can facilitate 
bargaining and deal-making, resulting in aggregate gains.   
 
The next four articles focus on accurately describing the thought processes that go into 
high-stakes financial decisions, and accounting for their practical consequences.  
Schwartz boldly proposes two tax policy modifications that take explicit account of 
anomalous risk preferences and choice patterns discovered in the psychology and 
economics literature.  Schwartz’s proposals attempt to redirect investment capital into the 
hands of entrepreneurs who are more likely to take risk, thereby achieving improved 
aggregate returns on investment capital.  Wennberg and Nykvist describe the decision 
processes and performance of professional financial forecasters in Sweden, finding much 
divergence between their empirical findings and standard economic models, but little 
evidence of economic harm.   Like Schwartz, Wennberg and Nykvist use an innovative 
in-depth interview methodology, which is unusual in economics.   Otto, Davies and 
Chater introduce a new tool for improving individual savings decisions, using survey data 
to take account of a variety of savings strategies and decision processes underlying 
financial decisions.  Finally, Yu explains Austrian-school psychological theory of 
entrepreneurial decision making, drawing on Hayek and Shutz to argue that subjective 
pattern recognition, once codified into rules of thumb, results in performance-enhancing 
simplifications that create socially beneficial order out of otherwise randomly distributed 
fields of information. 
 
The final four articles in this volume engage traditional themes in political economy with 
the question of what behavioral economics adds in the way of new insights about 
macroeconomic policy as a result of revised assumptions about individual behavior.  
Austin and Wilcox report experimental evidence about the statistical determinants of 
subjects’ policy views and the malleability of these views in the face of new evidence.  
Kokinov argues that cognitive psychologists now know enough about the determinants of 
risk attitudes that they can be applied to transition economies to encourage greater risk 
taking and cultivate entrepreneurial attitudes.  Altman weds contemporary behavioral 
theory about workers’ levels of effort with new interpretations of the writings of Adam 
Smith finding in behavioral theory more, not less, reason for optimism concerning 
globalization.  Finally, Berg and Maital argue that globalization is better described as a 
collection of discrete phenomena with multiple, nation-specific causes rather than a 
singular, inevitable phenomenon; behavioral economics suggests new reasons why 
heterogeneous policy approaches rather than one-size-fits-all institutions are necessary 
for improving wellbeing.   
 
The articles in this volume reveal an exciting research field that will remain active for 
years to come.  Rather than achieving a unified consensus, there clearly are multiple 
priorities for brining the descriptive findings of behavioral economics’ early years to bear 
on normative economics.  The contributors to this volume collectively prove that 
behavioral economics’ goal of improved empirical realism will necessitate more attention 
among researchers to the problem of connecting theory to applied problems and 
contemporary debates in business, economics and political economy. 
